Abstract. This study contributes to the debate about the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission mechanisms by exploring the link between the Mexican Central Bank's monetary policy announcements and interest rates futures volatility. The results show that announcements have a positive and significant impact on futures volatility and that this impact is mostly produced when a restrictive monetary policy stance is announced. Moreover, it shows that the change to an interest rate operational target has increased the non-anticipated component in monetary policy signalling.
Introduction
A topic of great interest, both for central banks and for financial markets, is the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission measured by the extent to which market participants can anticipate policy actions. If market reaction to policy announcements is large and significant it would imply that central banks are not succeeding in a smooth management of monetary policy information. Several studies have analysed this relation by measuring the impact of monetary policy announcements on changes in stock prices, in short and long term bond yields, or in interest rates futures (Cook and Hahn 1989, Edelberg and Marshall 1996 Although the majority of these studies have focused on the United States and the Fed's monetary policy actions, the topic has also raised interest in other financial markets. Results for the European Central Bank (ECB) show that in general market participants were able to predict ECB decisions quite well (Gaspar, PerezQuiroz and Sicilia 2002) , but policy actions are less predictable than Federal
Reserve or the Bank of England actions (Ross 2002) .
The aim of this study is to contribute to the debate by examining the impact of monetary policy announcements on market expectations in the case of Mexico.
Moreover, it exploits the fact that the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Mexico underwent through various changes during the last decade to explore the effects of a transition on the market's ability to anticipate the central bank movements. This study also differs with most of the announcement effect literature in that it is set in a conditional volatility framework. In particular, it focuses on the volatility of interest rate futures, instead of the level of returns, to measure to what extent monetary policy decisions are being anticipated by market participants. The intuition is that larger price volatility in days of policy announcements would indicate that these announcements contain significant new information that market participants did not anticipate, implying a low quality in information management by the central bank (Bernoth and von Hagen 2004) .
More specifically, to analyze the impact of monetary policy announcements, the research considers the 28-day interbank-rate futures contracts that are traded in the Mexican Derivatives Exchange. This contract, commonly known as TIIE futures, is one of the most useful instruments in Mexico to derive market expectations about interest rates given its liquidity, the availability of monthly maturities up to ten years ahead, and its common use as hedging instrument by market participants. According to trading volume, it is ranked among the 20 largest futures contracts in the world.
In addition to its relevance among global markets, the Mexican case is of particular interest because of the transition to an interest rate operational target and to a more transparent monetary policy signalling mechanism. Before 2004 the Central Bank did not determined a target for the overnight funds rate. Instead, it transmitted its policy intentions by establishing a target level for banks' current account balances at the central bank and penalizing banks with negative balances in those accounts. Because of the high market volatility in the aftermath of the 1995 financial crisis, the Central Bank deliberately decided not to set the target rate, since short term interest rates were the only reference in the money market.
Furthermore, in an environment of decreasing inflation rates, a target level for banks' current account balances allowed interest rates to decline in line with inflation expectations (Banco de Mexico, 2007 literature by assessing the impact on volatility, and by looking at the differences between several policy transmission' mechanisms within the same economy.
The rest of the document is organized as follows. The next section contains a review of previous studies. Section three provides the necessary background to understand the conduction of the Mexican monetary policy over the last 15 years.
The data and methodology are explained in sections four and five. Section six presents and discusses the results obtained while some final remarks are exposed in the last section.
Previous studies
There is an extensive amount of literature which studies the response of interest rates to changes in the central bank monetary policy stance. Probably the first study in this direction was by Cook and Hahn (1989) , who examined how yields on Treasury securities reacted to changes in target Fed fund rates between 1974 and 1979. Using just those days on which there was a change in the target, their procedure was to regress one-day changes in Treasury bills, notes and bonds rates on changes in federal funds target rate. They found that the response to increments in the target rate was positive and significant at all maturities, but smaller at the long end of the yield curve. Their work was followed by a large number of studies, including Sellon (1998a, 1998b) , Kuttner (2001) , Poole and Rasche (2000) , Poole, Rasche and Thornton (2002) or Hamilton (2008) . These studies developed further analysis either focusing on more recent periods or introducing improved specifications or techniques. A consistent result emerges from this literature: interest rates systematically respond to policy actions or policy related information, implying that these actions are not being fully anticipated.
After their introduction in the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) in 1989, the 30-day Federal Funds Futures contracts became popular as predictors of the Fed's changes in target rates. The question of the ability of the Fed funds futures rates to forecast the funds target rate and, by extension, short-run movements in monetary policy was initially considered by Carlson, McIntire and Thomson (1995) . Krueger and Kuttner (1996) presented more elaborated analysis and concluded that the Fed funds futures market is very good at anticipating changes in the target fund rate. Robertson and Thornton (1997) point out the difficulties arising from the fact that the fed funds futures rate forecasts the funds rate and not the funds rate target, but still agree in the usefulness of the federal funds futures rate as predictor of whether the Fed will change its target. Soderstrom (2001) shows that futures-based proxies for funds rate expectations have weak predictive power for the average funds rate using daily data but are more successful in predicting the average funds rate and the funds rate target around target changes and meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FMOC). The predictive power of futures rates has also being assessed by Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2006) and Gurkaynak (2005) for the Fed funds rate, while Sack (2004) demonstrates how to extract the expected policy path of monetary policy from futures rates, under the assumption that risk premia is constant over time and considering both Fed funds and Eurodollar futures contracts. Roley and Sellon (1998a) and Kuttner (2001) Regressing the change in the interest rate on the unexpected and expected components of the target rate change, Kuttner found a small and statistically insignificant response to the anticipated piece, while the response to the unanticipated component was large and highly significant. In fact, for the surprise component, the coefficients obtained were larger than those reported by Cook and Hahn. Poole and Rasche (2000) argued that monetary policy should be conducted in such a way that the market can predict policy actions. In other words, the interest rate futures rates can be used as a tool to measure the efficiency of monetary policy transmission. If the market was able to perfectly anticipate the central bank policy decisions -actions or non-actions -then market interest rates should adjust in response to information innovations, but not to the central bank's announcements of monetary policy decisions.
The research has widened up to include other central banks and markets, and it has also tended to support the view that, as transparency and markets' understanding of policy have increased over the years, the accuracy of market forecasts of central bank policy actions has improved. For example, Haldane and Read (2001) found that the introduction of inflation targeting in the United Kingdom appears to have a dampening effect in the yield curve responses at the short term. For the United States, Poole, Rasche and Thornton (2002) showed that predictability of the Fed's actions increased after the 1994 decision to announce changes in the target rate immediately after the FOMC meetings. The study of Gaspar, Perez-Quiroz and Sicilia. (2002) , examines the impact of the European Central Bank (ECB) policy decisions in the level and volatility of the daily overnight interbank rate (EONIA) using a GARCH model. They concluded that market participants were able to predict the ECB's interest rate decisions quite accurately. However, the study of Ross (2002) suggests there was some difficulty of the market in anticipating large changes in ECB target rates. Bernoth and von Hagen (2004) analyze three aspects of the predictability of interest rates in the European Monetary Union (EMU): the efficiency of the Euribor interest rate futures market, the impact of monetary policy announcements on the volatility of Euribor futures rates, and the effect of ECB policy announcements on the prediction error contained in Euribor futures rates. They find that Euribor futures rates with a forecast horizon of up to four months are unbiased and efficient predictors of future spot rates, and that the patterns in volatility indicated that market participants correctly anticipated the direction of interest rates changes intended by the ECB but there was uncertainty about the timing. During the first five years of EMU the average volatility of Euribor futures rates on Council days was significantly larger than on non-Council days. Finally they found that the information released by the Governing Council meetings did not improved the market's ability to forecast interest rates.
The Mexican Central Bank's Monetary Policy
Transmission Mechanism.
The "corto"
During the last decade the monetary transmission mechanism in Mexico have undergone important changes. The decade was marked by the recovery from the 1995 financial crisis that brought a strong depreciation of the currency, high inflation, and a severe deterioration in the real economy. In such a context, the Central Bank considered inadvisable to use target interest rates as operational target. The argument was that, in a period with high volatility and when shortterm interest rates were practically the only reference rates in the money market, it was not convenient to determine a specific level of interest rates: too low a rate would have encouraged lending and higher inflation, while a high rate would have By 1998, once the major difficulties posed by the crisis were overcame, Banco de Mexico started to signal a bias towards a restrictive monetary policy stance through a negative overdraft target on the cumulative balance of commercial banks' current accounts (the monetary policy instrument known as ''el corto'').
When the negative balance target is used, the central bank provides all the liquidity needed by the financial system. However, part of this liquidity, the size of the corto, was provided at the penalty rate. This action pressured interest rates upwards as banks tried to obtain the funds through the interbank market to avoid paying the penalty rate. An increase in the corto was thus interpreted as a signal of a tighter monetary policy stance, while its reduction was seen as a more neutral stance, even though the level of the corto was not taken to zero.
Transition to an interest rate operating target
Since 2001, Banco de Mexico's monetary policy has been conducted exclusively under an inflation targeting framework. In 2002, an annual inflation rate of 3% was defined as the long-term inflation target, with a variability interval of plus/minus one percentage point. The introduction by Banco de Mexico of inflation targeting has been associated with a major break in the transmission mechanism: since then, the level and volatility of inflation have not only declined, but the degree of inflation persistence has fallen (Capistran and Ramos-Francia 2006) and inflation has switched from a non-stationary to a stationary process (Chiquiar, Noriega and Ramos-Francia 2007) .
Once stability in financial markets and low inflation were attained, the exclusive use of the corto to signal the monetary policy stance became less appropriate. In an environment of stable inflation, the desired level of interest rates needs to be specified more clearly. Banco de Mexico has insisted that the change in operating target does not imply any other change in monetary policy objectives or instruments. Open market operations will continue to be carried out to attain a zero balance of banks' current accounts at the end of each day, and to provide or withdraw liquidity. The interest rates at which surpluses are rewarded will continue to be zero and the rate charged on banks' overdrafts will continue to be twice the overnight rate. 
TIIE Futures Contracts
The TIIE futures contracts are traded in the Mexican Derivatives Exchange (MexDer) and have as underlying 28-day deposits that produce yield at the 28-day TIIE. Each (28-day) TIIE futures contract covers a face value of $100,000
Mexican Pesos (approximately 7,600 US Dollars). MexDer lists and makes available for trading series of the TIIE futures contracts on a monthly basis for up to ten years. It is important to observe that, in contrast with analogous instruments like CME's Eurodollar or LIFFE's Short Sterling futures, TIIE futures quotes are in terms of future yields, not in terms of prices. The relation between the quoted future yield on day t and the corresponding futures price F t is determined by the formula F t = 100,000 1+Y t (28/36000)
( 1) where Y t is the quoted yield divided by 100. The last trading day and the maturity date for each series of 28-day TIIE futures contracts is the bank business day after the Central Bank holds the primary auction of government securities in the week corresponding to the third Wednesday of the maturity month. Since these primary auctions are usually held every Tuesday then, in general, expiration days for TIIE futures correspond to the third Wednesday of every month. For purposes of discharging obligations, settlement date on maturity is the bank business day after the maturity date.
Methodology

Sample data
The TIIE futures contract was initially listed in 1999 and it took a couple of years to reach reasonable levels of trading volume. 
where S t is the settlement price on day t, which is calculated according to formula
(1) 1 .
To avoid the problem of the limited lifespan of individual futures contracts, a panel is created by rolling over contracts: once the most immediate contract reaches maturity, we rollover each of the log-return series to the contract that is 1 For consistency TIIE spot rates are also transformed to prices.
next according to maturity. The result of this procedure is a panel consisting of 12 rollover series defined according to time to maturity. The first series (Series No.
1) contains log-returns for the most immediate contract, the second one contains log-returns for the contract that will expire between two and one months ahead, the third one log-returns for the contract with expiration between three and two months ahead, and so on.
As we mentioned before, in 
The GARCH Specification
To take into account the heteroscedasticity of the series, the study will consider a GARCH(1,1) specification to model the volatility of the futures prices. More specifically, to test the effects of monetary policy announcements, we will consider an AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model of the form
where µ is a constant, r t is the logarithmic change of settlement prices on day t and the residuals u t are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and conditional variance h t . The variable D n will be a dummy variable for the different type of monetary policy announcements. Moreover, to control for possible day-ofthe-week effects not related with monetary policy announcements, we will also include in the conditional variance equation daily dummies for days of the week as exogenous variables.
Equations (3) and (4) will be estimated jointly by maximum likelihood (ML). The ML estimates were obtained with RATS (v.5) software package using the BerndtHall-Hall-Hausman algorithm. Since the accuracy of GARCH model estimation and of the associated t-statistics may depend on the software employed, the maximum likelihood estimation was also performed under EViews package using the Marquardt optimization algorithm. Although the coefficient estimates and their standard errors differ slightly, the reported results are qualitatively the same.
The methodology is similar to the one used by financial economists to analyse the effects of economic data releases on market volatility (Bomfim, 2003 and Jones, Lamont and Lumsdaine, 1998) . These studies use GARCH estimations to model the conditional volatility to assess the surprise element of policy announcements.
Results and discussion
The reaction of the TIIE futures price volatility to monetary policy decisions will allow us to draw conclusions of how well money market participants predict Central Bank decisions. It also should indicate how the changes in the operational target affected the way monetary policy stance is transmitted to the market.
The analysis of the TIIE futures volatility is performed in two directions: the first focuses on the changes occurring between the first and second subperiods. The second takes into account the type of announcement. That is, the analysis not only considers the dates in which monetary policy announcements occur, but will also distinguish between restrictive announcements, expansive announcements or days where the announcement meant no change in the monetary policy conditions.
Preliminary analysis
Panels A, B and C in Table 2 provide summary statistics of each series of rate changes for the whole sample and for the first and second periods, respectively. All series, including the spot rate, tend to have negative skewness, they are leptokurtic and, according to the Bera-Jarque statistic, are far from being normally distributed. However, the non-normal behaviour tends to be stronger for nearby contracts. The Engle (1982) LM-test for an autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) effect clearly rejects the null of no ARCH effect in both the futures and TIIE log-price changes.
To further explore the behaviour of futures prices changes on announcement days we estimate the mean average abnormal return for each contract using the TIIE spot prices change as the expected return for the futures contract on any particular day. We use the following equation:
where ‫ܴܣ‬ ప തതതതത is the average abnormal return for contract i (i ∈ {1 to 12}), r t is the daily log return on day t for the futures contract from equation (2), and Y t is the daily log return for the spot TIIE. The average abnormal returns are estimated for all announcements, and for restrictive and expansive announcements separately. Fig. 3 (a) , (b) and (c) plot the average abnormal returns for all announcements, restrictive and expansive announcements respectively. Consistently, the magnitude of the average abnormal returns for every contract, regardless the time to expiration, is higher on the announcement days than days without monetary policy news. As it will be confirmed later, market participants seem to present a strong reaction to the information released by the Central Bank reflected on futures contract prices. Table 3 reports the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the GARCH(1,1) specification defined by equations (3) and (4) We now distinguish between announcements corresponding to an expansive policy, a restrictive policy or those that implied no change in the monetary policy conditions. Table 4 reports the coefficients obtained for the whole period and the subperiods when the dummy variable D nt in the GARCH(1,1) model takes the value 1 whenever the announcement corresponds to a relaxation of the monetary conditions and zero otherwise. It can be seen that, either in the whole period or in any of the subperiods, the effect of expansive announcements has little significance in explaining changes in volatility.
The impact of monetary policy announcements
In contrast, restrictive announcements appear to be significant for almost all contracts during the whole period, as can be seen in Table 5 . However, when the subperiods are considered separately, we find they behave very differently. While in the first period restrictive announcements do not appear to have a major effect on the volatility of the TIIE futures returns, in the second subperiod those announcements are highly significant.
Although not reported here, we should add that when we consider those announcements in which no change was made, only the nearby contracts appear to be affected, either on the whole period or in the subperiods. Although not reported, the normality and correlation tests for standardized residuals and squared standardized residuals confirm the adequacy of the model for all the series considered.
Controlling for day-of-the-week effects
Although differences in price volatility in futures contracts across days of the week has been mainly attributed to macroeconomic scheduled announcements, it is important to verify that abnormal behaviour during policy announcements is not the result of day-of-the week anomalies. These anomalies have been commonly reported in the literature, for example Dyl and Maberly (1986a,b) , Harvey and Huang (1991) , Ederington and Lee (1993) and Han, Kling, and Sell (1999) .
To control the potential effects of any recurrent pattern in a particular day of the week in the futures price returns and variance, we estimate the following regressions,
The where µ is a constant, r t is the logarithmic change of settlement prices on day t, the residuals u t are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and conditional variance h t . D nt is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when there is a monetary policy annoucement.* indicates significance at the 5% level. where µ is a constant, r t is the logarithmic change of settlement prices on day t, the residuals u t are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and conditional variance h t . D nt is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the monetary policy announcement is restrictive.* indicates significance at the 5% level.
